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Abstract  31 
Lujo virus is a novel old world arenavirus identified in Southern Africa in 2008 as the 32 
cause of a viral hemorrhagic fever (VHF) characterized by nosocomial transmission 33 
with a high case fatality rate of 80% (4/5 cases). Whereas this outbreak was limited, 34 
the unprecedented Ebola virus disease (EVD) outbreak in West Africa, and recent 35 
Zika virus disease epidemic in the Americas, has brought into acute focus the need for 36 
preparedness to respond to rare but potentially highly pathogenic outbreaks of 37 
zoonotic or arthropod-borne viral infections. A key determinant for effective control 38 
of a VHF outbreak is the time between primary infection and diagnosis of the index 39 
case. Here, we review the Lujo VHF outbreak of 2008 and discuss how preparatory 40 
measures with respect to developing diagnostic capacity might be effectively 41 
embedded into existing national disease control networks, such as those for HIV, 42 
tuberculosis and malaria. 43 
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Introduction  84 
There are four virus families known to cause viral hemorrhagic fever (VHF) in 85 
humans: Arenaviridae, Bunyaviridae, Filoviridae, and Flaviviridae. Whilst all VHFs 86 
can involve bleeding, hemorrhage is mostly a less common complication of severe 87 
infection. The general clinical picture for severe disease is one of grave multisystem 88 
syndrome with damage to the vascular system, and sometimes severe neurological 89 
symptoms [1], although many infections may also take a milder course. The natural 90 
reservoir hosts of these enveloped RNA viruses include a range of mammalian 91 
species, particularly rodents and bats. Most VHF viruses are transmitted to humans 92 
via direct contact with host body fluids or excreta, sometimes through an intermediate 93 
mammalian host. The Bunyaviridae and Flaviviridae VHF viruses are transmitted by 94 
insect vectors (ticks and mosquitoes). The CDC also now list two Paramyxoviridae 95 
(Hendra virus and Nipah virus) as VHF viruses, which whilst they are not associated 96 
with hemorrhage, many other aspects of the epidemiology and clinical presentation of 97 
these zoonotic viral infections show commonalities with the established VHFs [2]. 98 
 99 
Several outbreaks of VHF in humans are recorded each year globally [3]. With the 100 
glaring exception of the recent Ebola virus disease (EVD) epidemic in West Africa, 101 
VHF outbreaks are typically small; limited to less than 100 cases. The median number 102 
of cases for the 17 previous EVD outbreaks is 65 [4]. Possibly due to the generally 103 
limited size of outbreaks, viruses associated with VHF have not been considered a 104 
priority for research funding. Consequently, existing diagnostics and therapeutics are 105 
limited, as is our understanding of the epidemiology, transmission and animal 106 
reservoirs for some of these viruses. However, the recent EVD epidemic in West 107 
Africa has shown that VHF outbreaks can occur where least expected  (e.g. West 108 
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Africa, whereas most previous outbreaks were in Central Africa) [4, 5] and can 109 
rapidly spread out of control. As of 28th February 2016, the recent West African EVD 110 
outbreak had infected nearly 29,000 people, with over 11, 000 deaths [6]. Fragile and 111 
under-resourced health systems in these countries were sluggish in identifying the 112 
disease and were unable to respond rapidly and comprehensively enough to stop the 113 
spread of the disease [7]. The situation was further compounded by an initially slow 114 
and uncoordinated international response that has been widely condemned [8-11]. The 115 
unprecedented magnitude of the West African EVD outbreak, along with the 116 
significant number of EVD survivors with persistent detectable virus in various body 117 
fluids (semen, ocular fluid) after recovering from the disease [12, 13] and/or 118 
complications [14] plus the discovery that large numbers of people with no history of 119 
VHF are seropositive for Ebola virus [15, 16], has challenged our previous notions of 120 
the acute nature of these viral infections of humans and called to question our 121 
previous low-priority categorization of these infections with respect to research and 122 
health programme funding. A retrospective study from Sierra Leone documented 123 
serological evidence for infection with a range of VHF viruses (including Ebola and 124 
Marburg) in 2%-8% of patients using acute phase sera from Lassa virus negative 125 
febrile patients (collected Oct 2006-2008), suggesting that there could be Ebola and 126 
Marburg cases that are not characterised by rampant human-to-human transmission 127 
[17], similar to the established endemic nature of viruses like Dengue virus, Lassa 128 
virus, Hantavirus [18] and Rift Valley fever virus [19, 20]. As of 2016 the EVD 129 
epidemic is no longer out of control, but flare-ups continue: on March 17th Sierra 130 
Leone declared an end to a flare-up that started in January, yet on the very same day, 131 
a new case was confirmed in Guinea leading to 5 deaths as of 24th March 2016, 132 
prompting Liberia to close their shared border. This experience emphasizes the need 133 
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to develop regional and national research networks to better understand the 134 
underlying causes of these outbreaks.  135 
 136 
Lujo virus (LUJV) was discovered after an outbreak of VHF in Lusaka (Zambia) and 137 
Johannesburg (South Africa) in 2008 (Figure 1), and was the first novel VHF-causing 138 
virus to be identified in Africa since the discovery of Ebola virus in 1976 [21, 22]. 139 
Although the LUJV outbreak was limited to just 5 people, mortality was high (80%), 140 
with the low threshold of suspicion of VHF among healthcare workers resulting in 141 
diagnostic delay and nosocomial transmission. Here, we review the Lujo VHF 142 
outbreak of 2008 in light of the lessons learnt from the recent EVD epidemic in West 143 
Africa and the current Zika virus (ZIKV) disease epidemic in the Americas, and 144 
discuss the possible measures that could be taken by health authorities in Zambia and 145 
regionally, to efficiently integrate timely diagnosis of rare zoonotic diseases into 146 
existing health care, laboratory infrastructure and human resource capacity 147 
development programmes. 148 
 149 
The Lujo VHF outbreak of 2008 150 
In Zambia and South Africa in 2008, a novel arenavirus (LUJV) infected five people, 151 
killing the index case and three healthcare workers. The index case was a white 152 
female aged 36 who lived on a peri-urban farm close to Zambia’s capital, Lusaka. On 153 
September 2, she experienced a sudden onset of severe headache, myalgia, fever and 154 
sore throat and self-medicated with antipyretics and analgesics [23, 24]. On 155 
September 4 she travelled by air to South Africa to attend a wedding on September 6, 156 
returning to Zambia on September 7 (Day 5 of her illness), when she reported 157 
diarrhoea and vomiting (Ref [24] reports diarrhoea and vomiting on Day 2). Her 158 
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condition continued to worsen such that on day 7 of her illness, she visited a private 159 
clinic in Lusaka complaining of severe chest pains, fever, rash, and sore throat for 160 
which she was given an assortment of medications (including antiemetic, antipyretic, 161 
analgesic and broad spectrum antibiotics). Over the next two days, her condition 162 
rapidly degenerated as she experienced severe myalgias, facial swelling with central 163 
nervous system symptoms such as confusion and seizures. She was hospitalized on 164 
day 9 and evacuated the following day by air ambulance to a private hospital in 165 
Johannesburg, South Africa. On physical examination, the patient exhibited edema of 166 
the face and neck, rash, acute respiratory distress syndrome, but no haemorrhage was 167 
observed. Clinical laboratory tests showed that she had elevated liver transaminases, 168 
thrombocytopenia, and granulocytosis. The observation of a possible tick bite lead to 169 
a tentative diagnosis of Rickettsiosis and the patient received intravenous cefepime, 170 
clarithromycin, and linezolid, along with lactated Ringer’s solution and dobutamine 171 
[24]. Although intensive care treatment was instituted, together with hemodialysis and 172 
inotropic and vasopressor therapy, the patient’s condition degenerated rapidly with 173 
hemodynamic collapse and death on day 13 of her illness. No post-mortem was 174 
conducted.  175 
 176 
Cases 2-5 are described in detail elsewhere [24], and included one paramedic (Case 2) 177 
involved in the initial evacuation of the index case. Case 2 was diagnosed with 178 
suspected thrombotic thrombocytopenic purpura, which was then changed to 179 
suspected viral haemorrhagic fever a day later, after the epidemiological link with 180 
case 1 was made [24]. Case 3 was an intensive care unit (ICU) nurse that cared for the 181 
index case, and Case 4 was a cleaner who disinfected the room after the death of the 182 
index case. Cases 2-4 fell ill 9-13 days after probable exposure/contact with the index 183 
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case and all resulted in death. All three nosocomially-transmitted cases were unwell 184 
for 10-13 days in the community before they were admitted and an epidemiological 185 
link with the index case established as well as VHF infection control measures 186 
implemented. Case 3 was initiated on ribavirin on or around the same day that VHF 187 
was suspected in Case 2 (29th/30th September 2008). Case 4 fell ill and sought care at 188 
her local clinic on the 27th September, but when seen as an outpatient at her local 189 
hospital 6 days later (3 days after the VHF alert and contact tracing commenced), she 190 
was initiated on therapy for tuberculosis (TB). She was admitted two days later, at 191 
which point the contact tracing team made contact with her, and she was referred to 192 
the teaching hospital for treatment. 193 
 194 
Case 5 was a 47 year-old white female who also worked in the ICU and had contact 195 
with Patient 2 (but not with the index case), just two days before the VHF alert was 196 
raised. There were noted lapses in personal protection but fortunately by the time she 197 
fell ill she was known to the contact tracing team, and ribavirin was administered on 198 
day 2 of her illness based on suspected VHF. After being given ribavirin, patient 5 199 
became seriously ill needing mechanical ventilation, but gradually recovered and was 200 
discharged after 42 days in hospital. She suffered prolonged neurological sequelae for 201 
up to 6 months after discharge from hospital [24].  202 
 203 
The clinical presentation and course of Lujo VHF was quite consistent across all 4 204 
fatal cases, starting with myalgia, headache and fever, followed by onset of rash and 205 
pharyngitis on days 4-5. Vomiting and diarrhoea were present from days 3-7 and then 206 
the condition deteriorated with thrombocytopenia and elevated transaminases, severe 207 
neurological symptoms, hemodynamic collapse and death [24]. Patient 5 received 208 
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many of the same treatments as Patients 1-4, with the key differences that might have 209 
contributed to her survival being prompt initiation of treatment with ribavirin, 210 
recombinant factor VIIa, N-acetylcysteine, and atorvastatin [24]. 211 
 212 
Old World and New World Arenaviruses 213 
The family Arenaviridae consists of two genera, Mammarenavirus and 214 
Reptarenavirus, which infect mammals and reptiles respectively [25]. Arenavirus 215 
particles are enveloped and spherical in shape and possess a bi-segmented single-216 
stranded ambisense RNA genome comprising a large (L) and small (S) RNA segment, 217 
each contained within its own helical nucleocapsid [26]. The L segment encodes a 218 
viral RNA-dependent RNA polymerase (RDRP) and a smaller protein termed Z-219 
protein. The S segment encodes a viral nucleoprotein and viral glycoprotein precursor 220 
(Figure 2). Based on antigenic properties, geographical distribution, and phylogenetic 221 
analysis, mammalian arenaviruses are divided into two distinct groups: New World 222 
(NW) arenaviruses (Tacaribe serocomplex) and Old World (OW) arenaviruses 223 
(Lassa–lymphocytic choriomeningitis serocomplex) [25] (Figure 2). The NW 224 
arenaviruses that are known to infect humans include Junín virus (JUNV), Guanarito 225 
virus (GTOV), Machupo virus (MACV), Sabìa virus (SBAV) and Chapare virus 226 
(CHAPV). Although LUJV is only the third OW arenavirus which is known to be 227 
pathogenic in humans, along with Lassa fever virus (LASV) and lymphocytic 228 
choriomeningitis virus (LCMV) (Table 1), studies utilizing modern molecular tools 229 
including next generation sequencing technology are rapidly identifying new 230 
arenaviruses in rodent hosts [27]. Epidemiologically, the assumption is that these 231 
viruses are generally well adapted to their rodent hosts, and those that might be 232 
pathogenic in humans cause only mild febrile illness, otherwise more arenaviruses 233 
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would have been previously discovered. NW arenaviruses appear to be more 234 
commonly associated with human disease, possibly influenced by the use of different 235 
receptors [28]: OW arenaviruses such as LASV use α-dystroglycan (αDG) as a 236 
cellular receptor, which may be highly prevalent in the membranes of monocytes and 237 
dendritic cells [29], but the natural ligand of αDG, laminin, does not prevent virus 238 
infection in vitro and other candidate receptors (Axl, Tyro3, LSECtin and DC-SIGN), 239 
including some shared with Ebola, have been shown in vitro to facilitate cell entry 240 
[30]. The primary receptor for NW arenaviruses is transferin receptor 1 (TfR1) which 241 
is widely distributed and would facilitate a broad cell tropism [31] and there is in vitro 242 
evidence that even a single mutation can confer tropism to human cells [32]. 243 
 244 
Searching for the LUJV reservoir host 245 
There have been two studies aimed at finding the natural animal host of LUJV and to 246 
more broadly investigate the prevalence and molecular epidemiology of arenaviruses 247 
in rodents and small mammals in Zambia [33, 34]. Combining data from both studies, 248 
arenaviruses were identified in kidney tissues by polymerase chain reaction (PCR) in 249 
about 6% (23/408) of captured Natal multimammate rodents (Mastomys natalensis) 250 
and 33% (1/3) of African Pygmy Mice (Mus minutoides). Among 114 other animals 251 
tested (mainly Muridae species) no arenaviruses were detected (Figure 1).  Ninety six 252 
per cent (23/24) of arenavirus positive rodents were captured in peri-urban 253 
environments close to large human populations (Figure 1). Though the studies did not 254 
detect LUJV, two other novel arenaviruses were identified: LUAV (Lusaka-Namwala 255 
Virus) [33], a Lassa fever-like virus and LNKV (Lusaka New-Kasama Virus) [34], a 256 
novel lymphycytic choriomeningitis-related virus. The capacity of these novel viruses 257 
to infect humans is unknown.  258 
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 259 
Phylogenetic analysis of LUJV 260 
For other segmented RNA viruses, most notably influenza virus and SARS-CoV 261 
(Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome coronavirus), re-assortment and/or 262 
recombination are central to their importance as human pathogens, giving rise to the 263 
sudden emergence of novel species of global pandemic potential. There has hence 264 
been great concern that arenaviruses, with their established capacity to cause severe 265 
disease in humans, and their segmented RNA genomes, could also give rise to novel 266 
species with pandemic potential. Recombinant mammarenaviruses have been 267 
produced in the laboratory for vaccine development purposes [36, 37], and 268 
reptarenaviruses are highly recombinant (due to the pet trade and the housing of 269 
diverse snake species in close proximity) [38], but for wild-type mammarenaviruses 270 
with their segmented genomes and overlapping host species, the evidence for re-271 
assorted or recombinant species of either NW or OW mammarenaviruses is weak [39, 272 
40]. The variable position of some OW arenaviruses on different branches, depending 273 
on which viral protein is analysed, is suggestive of possible historical recombination 274 
events but the branch lengths (Figure 2) and sequence identities (Table 2) suggest 275 
these events have been followed by significant divergence. When analysing only a 276 
tiny fraction of the total number of quasi species in existence, more conserved regions 277 
might masquerade as evidence of recombination using some analysis tools [39]. As 278 
indicated in Table 2, the viral nucleoprotein appears to be more conserved than the 279 
other 3 viral proteins. 280 
 281 
Phylogenetically LUJV is interesting, as whilst amino acid identities show it is clearly 282 
among the OW arenaviruses, phylogenetic trees of amino acid sequences for all 4 283 
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viral proteins, consistently suggest that LUJV is the closest OW relative of the NW 284 
arenaviruses (Figure 2). The fact that all four viral proteins are similarly positioned 285 
for LUJV with respect to their closest relatives (LNKV and LCMV) (Figure 2) makes 286 
a recent recombinational origin highly unlikely, suggesting LUJV is an established 287 
virus in nature, but that we simply have not yet identified it’s reservoir host.  288 
 289 
Epidemiology of LUJV 290 
The index case had regular contact with animals since she kept dogs, cats and horses 291 
at her premises, and the outbreak response team found evidence of rodents, the natural 292 
host of all known arenaviruses [23], around the stables. Case 1 reportedly cut her shin 293 
on a broken bottle on the 30th August, 3 days before she became ill [23], and so it is 294 
plausible that the wound came into contact with rodent faeces/urine, but in Lusaka, 295 
whether on peri-urban farms or in crowded townships, people are in close contact 296 
with rodents, and so if the natural host is a common rodent species, it begs the 297 
question of why LUJV infections are not more common in humans? Taken together 298 
with previous surveillance studies that did not detect LUJV in 420 wild-captured 299 
rodents [33, 34], it seems plausible to speculate that a rare and unlikely transmission 300 
event led to the infection of a human by LUJV. The environment around the farm 301 
would support other small mammal species (rabbits, genets, civets etc…), but as 302 
arenaviruses seem to have co-evolved with their rodent hosts, the phylogenetic 303 
evidence suggests that the natural host of LUJV should also be a rodent [35].  304 
 305 
It might be a rare species, or one that is rarely in contact with human settlement, 306 
and/or transmission to humans might require a vector such as a tick, which might 307 
explain the possible requirement for the presence of other domestic animals such as 308 
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horses. Whilst the main route of arenavirus transmission is through contact with urine 309 
or faeces, the Tacaribe virus was purportedly isolated from mosquitoes as well as 310 
bats, and has recently been detected in ticks [41]. The physicians who attended the 311 
index case of Lujo VHF in South Africa recorded what they thought could be a 312 
potential tick-bite on the patient’s foot [24]. Although this may be coincidental, future 313 
surveillance of ticks and mosquitoes for novel RNA viruses is possibly warranted, 314 
particularly in light of the recent ZIKV disease outbreak in the Americas [42] and a 315 
recent next generation sequencing study of mosquitoes in China identified multiple 316 
novel flaviviruses [43].  317 
 318 
What limited the Lujo VHF outbreak? 319 
There are several features of the LUJV outbreak that may have contributed to the 320 
limited spread of the virus: The index case was relatively wealthy, living on a peri-321 
urban farm, and seeking care in a small private hospital. For this reason she had 322 
minimal contact with other people whilst she was ill. Also, human-to-human 323 
transmission of LUJV appears to occur in the late stages of the infection, maybe 324 
during the last 3 days before death [24], a likely smaller window of transmission 325 
compared with EVD [44]. Whilst the 2008 outbreak did not spread to urban 326 
populations, in a possible future scenario, an infected individual could travel to 327 
crowded urban centres, dramatically increasing the risk of an un-containable spread. 328 
At the private hospital involved in the LUJV outbreak, the level of awareness for 329 
possible VHF was low [24], and without intervention this is likely also to be the case 330 
at over-crowded government clinics that serve poor communities in Lusaka. Health 331 
seeking behaviour may involve visiting traditional healers that would also delay 332 
diagnosis, as documented in West Africa during the recent EVD epidemic [45]. 333 
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Zambia’s high burden of HIV/TB, malnutrition and other diseases of poverty could 334 
also impact on the size and impact of a future outbreak. Taking all these factors into 335 
consideration, it would be dangerously complacent to think that the magnitude and 336 
spread of a potential future LUJV outbreak will be similar to that of 2008.  337 
  338 
LUJV Diagnostic Preparedness 339 
The un-predictable nature of VHF outbreaks presents a challenge to poorly resourced 340 
health systems across Africa, as to what level of resources we should commit to rare 341 
but potentially high-impact outbreaks. The LUJV outbreak originated in Zambia, a 342 
country with no prior recorded VHF outbreak, although there is recent evidence from 343 
a flavivirus seroprevalence study undertaken in Western and North-Western provinces 344 
of low-level exposure to Yellow fever virus (YFV) (Plaque Reduction Neutralization 345 
Titre ≥1:10 0.5% (66.6% IgG+ve. 33.3% IgM+ve)), Dengue virus (DENV) (4.1% 346 
IgG+ve), West Nile virus (WNV) (10% IgG+ve) and ZIKV (6% IgG+ve) [46]. A 347 
filovirus modelling study based on reservoir host distribution suggests Zambia is very 348 
low risk for Ebola, but conversely, is at the centre of a putative ‘Marburg belt’, 349 
although there have been no recorded cases of Marburg VHF in Zambia [47]. With 350 
ever increasing international travel within Africa, and globally, all countries are 351 
potentially at risk from human importation of VHF, and so should have in place some 352 
kind of diagnostic capacity, at the very minimum, to provide some kind of diagnostic 353 
service until regional/international assistance is mobilized. 354 
 355 
For VHF outbreaks in Africa the process of pathogen identification has historically 356 
been outsourced to U.S and European biosafety level 4 (BSL-4) laboratories, but the 357 
development of rapid molecular diagnostic tests for known VHF pathogens, and the 358 
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increasing availability of molecular diagnostic platforms on the continent, supported 359 
by HIV and TB diagnostic capacity development initiatives, makes a national or 360 
regional primary diagnostic response highly feasible [48]. WHO collaborating centres 361 
for VHF diagnosis now include five African research institutes, in South Africa, 362 
Gabon, Kenya, Uganda and Senegal, but in late 2013, after the first reports of 363 
mysterious and sudden deaths in Guinea in December, it took 4 months before Ebola 364 
virus was identified on 22nd March, 2014, in European BSL-4 laboratories [10]. The 365 
subsequent international response has been widely criticised as being unacceptably 366 
slow [10], with this initial 4 month window between infection of the index case and 367 
identification of the causal agent a key failure that allowed the virus to take hold and 368 
spread regionally. A range of factors, both human (population demographics, health 369 
seeking behaviour, burial practices, government response etc…) and viral 370 
(pathogenicity and transmissibility of the specific virus strain), have probable impact 371 
on eventual outbreak size and impact, but molecular confirmation of the presence of a 372 
hemorrhagic fever virus is now the seminal event, that gives local and international 373 
health officials the confirmation they need to mobilize a comprehensive infection 374 
control response. Having functional molecular diagnostic capacity nationally or 375 
regionally is key to the control of future VHF outbreaks. 376 
 377 
The first consideration for laboratory diagnosis of highly pathogenic viruses is 378 
biological safety. History has shown that laboratories are high risk environments [49] 379 
and there needs to be a comprehensive plan and standard operation procedures in 380 
place, to ensure worker safety and outbreak prevention. VHF viruses are BSL-4 381 
pathogens, but due to the cost of construction and maintenance, these facilities are 382 
available at just a few centres and are primarily required for infecting cell culture or 383 
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culturing dangerous pathogens. For diagnosis in the field or at a national reference 384 
laboratory, the West African EVD outbreak has led to well-established protocols for 385 
‘relatively’ safe collection of specimens and specimen handling for molecular 386 
diagnosis [50], with emphasis and training on appropriate personal protective 387 
equipment and specimen handling techniques. Importantly, these safety measures 388 
need to be applied to specimens collected from any contacts of the index case, before 389 
the specific etiological agent is confirmed. For known VHF pathogens there are an 390 
increasing number of molecular diagnostic assays becoming available [48]. WHO 391 
recently approved six new rapid diagnostic tests for EVD; three real-time RT-PCR 392 
tests, two immunochromatographic tests and one multiplex PCR test [51]. A modest 393 
stock of such diagnostics, including positive and negative controls, re-ordered on 394 
expiry, would cost little and could be embedded into on-going training and skills 395 
development activities. In contrast to the traditional technology of cell culture, 396 
molecular techniques do not run the risk of amplifying infectious material. 397 
 398 
In Zambia, the University of Zambia School of Veterinary Medicine (UNZASVM) 399 
BSL-3 laboratory has been nominated by the Zambian Ministry of Health as the 400 
national outbreak response diagnostic facility. Diagnosis of suspected cases of VHF is 401 
currently carried out using conventional RT-PCR with sets of primers for the 402 
detection of Ebola, Marburg, Lujo and Lassa fever viruses [52]. Sanger sequencing 403 
facilities are also available but are of limited use for detecting unknown/novel VHF 404 
viruses (species or strains) that are not detected by the available assays. Plans are 405 
being drawn up to invest in Next Generation Sequencing technology, through the new 406 
Illumina MiniSeq and/or Oxford Nanopore minION sequencer, the latter of which has 407 
already been used in the field to study the molecular epidemiology of Ebola [53]. In 408 
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the absence of suspected VHF cases, these technologies will be actively used for 409 
research projects on other infectious disease priorities, building the human resource 410 
capacity to offer rapid pathogen identification services in the event of future VHF or 411 
respiratory virus outbreaks. 412 
 413 
Conclusions 414 
LUJV causes severe hemorrhagic fever with highly permissive human-to-human 415 
transmission and high case fatality. The animal reservoir and mode of transmission to 416 
humans are unknown and the virus is phylogenetically equidistant from other major 417 
OW arenaviruses. The limited nature of the LUJV outbreak in 2008 was fortuitous, 418 
but the identity, location and scale of possible future arenavirus or other VHF 419 
outbreaks cannot be predicted. For this reason the development of diagnostic capacity 420 
across the region is essential to facilitate a rapid and effective response. For known 421 
VHF pathogens, national governments should ensure that appropriate and effective 422 
means for diagnostic response is embedded within their leading research institutions. 423 
For identifying novel VHF pathogens, the required technology is becoming 424 
increasingly more available and affordable, and could be used for a range of research 425 
activities, training and building up the skills and experience of personnel to respond 426 
effectively to novel infectious disease diagnostic challenges.  427 
 428 
 429 
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Table. Summary of mammalian arenaviruses and their associated epidemiological featuresa 
Virus, Abbreviation and 
isolation/detection date  
Isolated Lineage/Clade Natural host Geographic distribution Disease in humans 
Old World Arenaviruses   
   
Lymphocytic 
choriomeningitis virus, 
LCMV, 1933 
Yes LCM 
Mus musculus Linnaeus (house 
mouse) 
Apodemus sylvaticus Linnaeus 
(long-tailed field mice) 
Americas, Europe 
Undifferentiated febrile illness, aseptic meningitis; 
rarely serious. Lab infections common, usually mild 
but 5 fatal cases. 
Lassa virus, LASV, 1969,  Yes Lassa Mastomys sp. (Multimammate rat) 
West Africa, imported 
cases in Europe, Japan, 
USA 
Lassa fever; mild to severe and fatal disease. Lab 
infection common and often severe. 
Mopeia virus, MOPV, 1977  Yes Mopeia 
Mastomys natalensis (Multimammate 
rat) 
Mozambique, Zimbabwe Unknown 
Mobala virus, MOBV, 1983  Yes Mobala Praomys sp. (soft-furred mouse) Central African Republic Unknown 
Ippy virus, IPPYV, 1984  Yes Lassa 
Arvicanthis sp. (unstriped grass rats) 
Praomys sp. (soft-furred mouse) 
Central African Republic Unknown 
Merino Walk, MWV, 1985  Yes Merino 
Myotomys unisulcatus sp. (Busk 
Karoo rat) 
South Africa Unknown 
Menekre, 2005  No Mopeia 
Hylomyscus sp. (African wood 
mouse) 
Ivory Coast Unknown 
Gbagroube, 2005  No Lassa 
Mus (Nannomys) setulosus (African 
pigmy mouse) 
Ivory Coast Unknown 
Morogoro, 2007  No Mopeia 
Mastomys natalensis (Multimammate 
rat) 
Tanzania Unknown 
Kodoko, 2007  Yes LCM 
Mus (Nannomys) minutoides 
(savannah pygmy mouse) 
Guinea Unknown 
Lujo virus, LUJV, 2008  Yes Lujo Unknown Zambia, South Africa Fatal hemorrhagic fever 
Lemniscomys, 2008  No Lassa 
Lemniscomys rosalia (Single-striped 
grass mouse) Mastomys natalensis 
(Multimammate rat) 
Tanzania Unknown 
Lunk virus, LNKV, 2008  No LCM 
Mus minutoides (savannah pygmy 
mouse) 
Tanzania Unknown 
Luna virus, LUAV, 2009  Yes 
Lusaka-
Namwala 
Mastomys natalensis (Multimammate 
rat) 
Zambia Unknown 
Whenzou, 2014   No  Rattus norvegicus (Brown rat) China Unknown 
Gairo, 2015  No Mobala 
Mastomys natalensis (Multimammate 
rat) 
Tanzania Unknown 
New World Arenaviruses      
Tacaribe, 1956  Yes B 
Originally isolated from Artibeus sp. 
(bats) but later in vivo experiments on 
Artibeus jamaciensis suggested they 
are not the reservoir hosts [54] 
Trinidad, West Indies 
Unknown. One suspected lab case that was moderately 
symptomtic. 
Junín, 1958  Yes B 
Calomys musculinus (drylands vesper 
mouse) 
Argentina 
Argentinian hemorrhagic fever. Lab infection common 
often severe. 
Machupo, 1963  Yes B 
Calomys callosus (large vesper 
mouse) 
Bolivia 
Bolivian hemorrhagic fever. Lab infection common 
often severe. 
Cupixi, 1965  Yes B Oryzomys gaeldi (rice rat) Brazil Unknown 
Amapari,1965  Yes B 
Neacomys guianae (Guiana Bristly 
mouse) 
Brazil Unknown 
Parana, 1970  Yes A Oryzomys buccinatus (Paraguayan Paraguay Unknown 
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Rice Rat) 
Tamiami, 1970  Yes A Sigmodon hispidus (hispid cotton rat) Florida, USA Antibodies detected 
Pichinde, 1971  Yes A 
Oryzomys albigularis (Tomes's Rice 
rat) 
Colombia Occasional mild lab infection. 
Latino, 1973  Yes C 
Calomys callosus (large vesper 
mouse) 
Bolivia Unknown 
Flexal, 1977  Yes A Oryzomys spp. (Rice rats) Brazil One severe lab infection recorded 
Guanarito, 1989  Yes B 
Zygodontomys brevicauda (Short-
tailed Cane mouse) 
Venezuela Venezuelan hemorrhagic fever 
Sabia, 1993  Yes B Unknown Brazil 
Viral hemorrhagic fever, two severe lab infections 
recorded. 
Oliveros, 1996  Yes C Bolomys obscuris (Dark bolo mouse) Argentina Unknown 
Whitewater Arroyo, 1997  Yes D Neotoma spp. (Wood rats) 
USA: New Mexico, 
Oklahoma, Utah, 
California, Colorado 
Unknown 
Pirital, 1997  Yes A 
Sigmodon alstoni (Alston's Cotton 
Rat) 
Venezuela Unknown 
Pampa, 1997  Yes  Bolomys sp. Argentina Unknown 
Bear Canyon, 1998  Yes D 
Peromyscus californicus (California 
mouse), Neotoma macrotis (large-
eared woodrat) 
USA: California Unknown 
Ocozocoautla de Espinosa, 
2000 
No B 
Peromyscus mexicanus (Mexican deer 
mouse) 
Mexico Unknown 
Allpahuayo, 2001  Yes A 
Oecomys bicolor, (Bicolored Arboreal 
Rice Rat) Aecomys paricola 
Peru Unknown 
Tonto Creek, 2001  Yes D 
Neotoma albigula (white-throated 
woodrat) 
USA: Arizona Unknown 
Big Brushy Tank, 2002  Yes D 
Neotoma albigula (white-throated 
woodrat) 
USA: Arizona Unknown 
Real de Catorce, 2005  No D 
Neotoma leucodon (White-toothed 
Woodrat) 
Mexico Unknown 
Catarina, 2007  Yes D 
Neotoma micropus (Southern Plains 
Woodrat) 
USA: Texas Unknown 
Skinner Tank, 2008  Yes D 
Neotoma mexicana (Mexican 
woodrat) 
USA: Arizona Unknown 
Chapare, 2008  Yes B Unknown Bolivia Single fatal hemorrhagic fever case 
Middle Pease River, 2013  No D 
Neotoma micropus (southern plains 
woodrats) 
USA: Oklahoma, Texas, 
New Mexico 
Unknown 
Patawa, 2015  Yes A Oecomys spp. (Arboreal Rice Rat) French Guiana Unknown 
Pinhal, 2015  No ? 
Calomys tener (Delicate vesper 
mouse) 
Brazil Unknown 
aAdapted from (24, CDC website) 
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Figure 1. Map illustrating cross border transmission of LUJV in 2008, the results of small mammal Arenavirus surveillance in 2010/11, 
and Flavivirus seroprevalence studies undertaken in Zambia in 2015. 
 
NC = species not collected or screened 
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Figure 2. Phylogentic trees of all 4 arenavirus-encoded proteins for representative OW viruses, along with NW arenaviruses: Junín 
virus (JUNV) and Tacaribe virus (TCRV). 
 
 
Lassa (strain Josiah), LCMV (strain Armstrong), See list of abbreviations for other virus names. RDRP = RNA-Dependent RNA 
Polymerase. Scale = substitutions per site. Phylogenetic trees of amino acid sequences generated on Clustal Omega using default 
parameters. NCBI accession numbers and sequence files used available on request from corresponding author. 
 
Table 2 Identity matrix showing amino acid percentage identity, for all 4 viral proteins, between LUJV and 
representative OW and NW arenaviruses 
 
OW 
Arenviruses 
Arenavirus protein 
RDRP Z NP GPC 
WENV 45 43 60 44 
IPPV 46 42 57 42 
GAIV 45 44 59 42 
MWV 43 43 57 42 
LASV 43 49 59 42 
MOBV 44 46 59 43 
LUAV 44 47 60 43 
MOPV 45 51 57 43 
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MORV 45 44 57 43 
LNKV 43 44 61 44 
LCMV 43 46 60 44 
NW 
Arenavruses     
TCRV 36 29 48 39 
JUNV 37 30 48 40 
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